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Insurance -1962

Tennessee Survey

Robert N. Covington*
1. SELECTION AND CONTROL OF RISKS

A. Defining the Risk
1. Vendee of Automobile Covered by Omnibus Clause of Vendor's
Liability Policy
2. FirePolicy Coverage of AppertainingStructures
3. Loss Due to "Negligence of Repairer" Within Marine,Policy
4. Definition of Confining Sickness
B. Exceptions and Representations
1. Interpretationof Insanity Exception in HospitalizationPolicy
2. Oral Warranty Not Within Exclusion Clause of Garage Liability
Policy
3. Misrepresentationsby Applicant; Contracting Disease After Inception
of Health Policy a Valid Condition Precedent
II. MiaKNG AND MODIFYING T=E CONTRACT

A. Insurer Held Estopped To Rely on Coverage Limitation Because of
Agent's Conduct
B. ForbearanceTo Cancel Policy Held Valid Considerationfor Rider Limiting Coverage
C. Fire Insurance Agent Held Not To Be Agent of Insured for Purpose of
Cancellation
III. GOwRNAMNT REGULATION

IV.

NIEGOTATON AND SETrLEMENT

A. Enforcement of ArbitrationProvisionfor Appraisal of Loss
B. Allocating Proceeds of Credit Life Policy
C. Insurer's Duty To Settle Under Liability Policy

The courts of Tennessee were confronted by a number of interesting
problems of insurance law during 1962. For the most part, the results
were neither startling nor unsettling. There were, however, decisions

that seem to qualify previous opinions, sometimes without citation,
and there was one very troublesome opinion concerning credit life
insurance.
*Assistant Professor of law, Vanderbilt University; faculty editor, Vanderbilt Law
Review.
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CONTROL OF RISKS

A. Defining the Risk
1. Vendee of Automobile Covered by Omnibus Clause of Vendor's
Liability Policy.-Carson Deuberry owned a delivery truck which was
the described vehicle in an automobile liability policy issued to him by
State Farm Mutual. During the period of the policy, Deuberry agreed
to sell the truck to Adell Butler for $200. Butler was without funds
and could not make any payment on the vehicle at the time the
contract to sell was entered into. Deuberry nonetheless gave possession of the truck to Butler, but retained the title certificate, which
under section 59-1038 of the Tennessee Code Annotated is prima facie
evidence of ownership. The apparent understanding of the parties
was that when Butler could make a significant payment on the truck,
Deuberry would transfer the title to him in the normal fashion.
While this arrangement continued, Butler was involved in an accident as the result of his negligent operation of the truck. The accident resulted in the death of plaintiff's husband, and she successfully
prosecuted a personal injury action against Butler. Since he was
judgment proof, plaintiff brought this action against State Farm
Mutual on the theory that Butler was an additional insured within the
coverage of the omnibus clause of the policy issued to Deuberry.
Both the federal district court and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit' agreed with plaintiffs argument. The court of appeals found
that Butler was not the "owner" of the truck within the meaning of
that term as defined by the Tennessee statute, but that Deuberry remained the owner. The court cited testimony of the parties to the contract to sell indicating that this was their intention. 2 Therefore, Butler
was simply using the truck with Deuberry's permission, and as such
was an additional insured.
This case is interesting largely because it neither cites nor distinguishes an earlier decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court, Home
Indemnity Co. v. Bowers,3 which might have led the attorneys of the
jurisdiction to anticipate a different result. In that case, the court
held that a vendee under a conditional sales contract was not an
additional insured within the coverage of the vendor's policy under
the omnibus clause. The two cases are not necessarily in conflict. For
one thing, the vendee in the Bowers case was a party to a conditional
sales contract, not merely to an executory contract to sell. More important, in the earlier case, the Tennessee court discussed at some
length a California decision4 which held that a conditional vendee was
1.
2.
3.
4.

Benton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 306 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1962).
Id. at 181.
194 Tenn. 560, 253 S.W.2d 750 (1952).
Votaw v. Farmers Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch., 15 Cal. 2d 24, 97 P.2d 958 (1940).
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covered under the omnibus clause of his vendor's policy, and distinguished it, in part on the ground that the parties had not yet
executed the formal documents necessary to satisfy the California
Owners Responsibility Law. Similarly, in the instant case the parties
had not even attempted to execute the formal documents necessary to
register title in Butler's name.
One should be cautious in relying on this decision. The court of
appeals is careful to point out that section 59-1038 refers only to prima
facie ownership. 5 In a case in which it is clear that the parties intend
at least equitable ownership to be in the vendee under their agreement, it is probable that the Bowers principle would be applied, regardless of failure to execute a new certificate of title. To hold other6
wise would be excessively formalistic.
2. Fire Policy Coverage of Appertaining Structures.-Plaintiff insured in Bowlin v. Federated Mutual Implement & Hardware Insurance Co.7 based his claim on one of the extended coverage provisions available as a rider on the standard fire policy. The clause
provided that the insured could apply up to ten per cent of the face
amount of the policy covering his house "to cover private structures
appertaining to the premises described for that dwelling and located
thereon.... ." The structure which burned was a barn located across
the street from the insured dwelling. Plaintiff insured had once lived
in a house on the same side of the street, and on the same parcel of
land, as the barn. In 1948 he had sold this previous dwelling and the
land on which it was located and had moved into the insured dwelling. The purchaser of the insured's former home apparently had not
wanted the barn or the land on which it stood, so insured had retained
title to the structure and at the time of loss was using the barn for
storage purposes.
The court, speaking through Chief Justice Prewitt, held that the
barn was not an appertaining structure within the meaning of the
policy. It did so because the structure was not on the same lot as that
described in the policy, pointing out that certainly no deed conveying
the dwelling would be held to convey title to the barn as an appertaining part of the same property. The chief justice noted that a contrary holding would create grave uncertainty about the coverage
afforded under such clauses. If this structure was held covered, why
5. The Tennessee courts have frequently permitted the presumption created by the
statute to be rebutted. See, e.g., Callis v. Capitol Chevrolet, Inc., 26 Tenn. App. 309,
171 S.W.2d 828 (M.S. 1943).
6. The few cases that have involved this type of fact situation would indicate that
this is the proper rule. See Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 668 (1954). An analogous problem
is treated in Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 213 F. Supp. 669
(N.D. Ohio 1962) (garage liability policy).
7. 357 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn..1962).
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not a storage building three blocks away, or six or eight, or even a
mile distant? There is considerable force in this argument based on
the need for certainty. The courts of this and other jurisdictions have
been unable to achieve certainty in the interpretation of a similar fire
policy coverage provision, that covering "additions" to the basic
structure; the resulting decisions have been confusing at best.8
3. Loss Due to "Negligence of Repairer" Within Marine Policy.The continued development of Tennessee rivers and lakes by TVA and
other agencies will bring about the widened use of marine insurance
in this jurisdiction. Insurance agents and attorneys unfamiliar with
these policies may find them troublesome since most marine policies
originated in the context of ocean-going marine traffic. The often
antiquated language of these policies is not always well suited to the
risks that exist on inland waterways. The difficulties that can result
are illustrated by Russell Mining Co. v. Northwestern Fire & Marine
Insurance Co.9 Defendant in this case issued a time-hull policy to
cover a barge moored to the bank of Chickamauga Lake used by
plaintiff in its coal mining operations. To keep the barge pumped out,
electric water pumps were installed in two of the barge's compartments. One of plaintiffs employees was engaged in wiring an electric
motor for a coal crusher at the barge site. In order to do his work
properly, he turned off the master switch at the location. The pumps
were, therefore, receiving no current. When the employee left at the
end of the day, he did not turn the switch back on. By morning, the
barge had shipped so much water that it sank. Plaintiff filed a claim
which defendant refused to pay, and this suit resulted.
Plaintiff's claim is based on the Inchmaree clause of the policy, providing, inter alia:
This insurance also covers loss of or damage to the vessel named herein
directly caused by . .. breakdown of motor generators or other electrical

machinery . . . [or] negligence of charters or repairers (other than the

assured in both cases) master, mariners, or pilots: Provided that such loss

or damage has not resulted from want of due diligence by the assured, the

owners or managers of the vessel, or any of them.

The standard marine policy was early held to cover only "perils of the

sea," so that accidental damage occurring during loading, repairing,
and the like was not covered.' 0 The Inchmaree clause was added to
close this gap. Defendant argued that since this was the basic intention of the clause, it "has no application to an unmanned, moored
8. See 4 APPLEz-xAN, INsURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 2324-28 (1941); Annot., 19
A.L.R.2d 606 (1951).
9. 207 F. Supp. 162 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
10. VANCE, INSURANc, 927-28 (3d ed. Anderson 1951).

1963]

INSURANCE

barge on inland water."" The court conceded that the policy was
not drawn "to insure floating barges moored upon inland creeks in
the twentieth century"' 2 but rejected defendant's argument that the
clause was inapplicable. Defendant chose the policy it issued; it
undoubtedly had greater familiarity with marine risks than the plaintiff insured. It would therefore be inequitable to allow the defendant
to say that the language it selected to use was inapplicable because
drawn to suit another type of risk, especially since it had kept the
same policy in force on the barge for over four years.
Defendant also interposed two other defenses. It argued that the
negligence which caused the loss was not that of a "repairer (other
than the assured .... )" but was the negligence of the insured in
allowing the barge to become so rusted that without the pumps it was
in danger of sinking. In all standard marine policies, the insured is
held to make an implied warranty of seaworthiness. 13 This means
simply that the vessel is "sufficiently strong and tight to resist the
perils reasonably incidental to the voyage for which she is insured
.. . ."4

In this case, the court found as a matter of fact that for the

very limited purpose for which this barge was afloat it was seaworthy,
so long as the pumps were working. Therefore the proximate cause of
the loss was turning off the pumps. Within the meaning of the policy,
the employee wiring the motor was a "repairer other than the assured"
because for the purpose of that-clause the term "the assured" includes
only the principal officers and managers of the named insured, not
employees of a lower rank.15 The court also indicated that even if the
cause of the loss was not the negligence of the repairer the loss would
still be covered under the language about breakdown of electrical
machinery.
Finally, the defendant argued that there had been a want of due
diligence on the part of the insured. In part, this argument seems
to have been based on the rusting of the barge which the court had
disposed of on the issue of seaworthiness. It was also based, however,
on the fact that plaintiffs weighman who was in charge of the barge
had not checked on the pumps before leaving the barge at the end
of the working day. On this issue the court held simply that the
weighman was not of managerial level, although the barge was primarily in his care, and that under maritime law his negligence could
not therefore be ascribed, to the insured.
4. Definition of Confining Sickness.-In Prudence Life Insurance
11. 207 F. Supp. at 165.
12. Ibid.
13. Marine insurance is unique in having implied warranties. See PATrEsoN,
EssENTxus OF INSURANCE LAw 299-301 (2d ed. 1957).
14. VANCE, INSURANCE § 169 (3d ed. Anderson 1951).
15. See 4 APP.E EAN, INSTRAN c LAw AND PRACTiCE § 2689 (1963 Supp.).
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Co. v. Hoppe16 the Western Section of the Tennessee Court of Appeals
was called on to determine the meaning of the term "confining sickness ' 7 under a disability policy providing for monthly benefits of unlimited duration in case of total disability resulting from such sickness.
In 1951, plaintiff insured suffered a coronary thrombosis while residing in St. Louis and was hospitalized there. He was paid benefits
for some time under other provisions of the policy. In June 1957,
plaintiff moved to Memphis. He remained totally disabled, but no
longer required regular attendance of a physician (although he still
consulted physicians from time to time), and was able to go outside
the house some five times between June 1957 and the commencement
of this action.
Was defendant insurer liable under these facts to make payments
to the plaintiff for a total disability resulting from a confining sickness? In a dictum, the court indicated that if Tennessee law were to
be applied, plaintiff would recover.' 8 The rights under this contract,
however, were held to be controlled by Missouri law. 19 After a consideration of conflicting Missouri decisions, the court found that
recovery should be denied. Obviously, the case contributes little to
the Tennessee law of insurance. It simply underscores the truth of the
black-letter statement in Vance on Insurance: "The terms of [disability] contracts vary a great deal and on many important points the
courts are not agreed as to the interpretation which should be placed
on the agreement which the parties have made, even in some instances where the language is identical."2 0
B. Exceptions and Representations
1. Interpretationof Insanity Exception in HospitalizationPolicy.Rapid changes in modern medicine with regard to mental illness have
frequently brought about confusion and uncertainty in the law. Interstate Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. HoustonP1 confronted the
Court of Appeals for the Western Section with one of these problems,
which was accorded what may be a deceptively simple solution.
Plaintiff was insured under a hospitalization policy which contained
16. 352 S.W.2d 244 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1962).
17. The definition in the policy contains two elements. Insured must be confined
"continuously within doors" and require "regular visits by a legally qualified physician
or surgeon." Id. at 245.
18. This dictum is clearly correct. In Brandt v. Mutual Benefit Health & Acc.
Ass'n, 30 Tenn. App. 14, 202 S.W.2d 827 (M.S. 1947), recovery was allowed under
nearly identical facts.
19. The conflict of laws principle involved is not discussed by the court at any length.
See Gray v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 178 Tenn. 88, 156 S.W.2d 391 (1941); Roberts v.
Winton, 100 Tenn. 484, 45 S.W. 673 (1898).
20. VANcE, INsuRANcE § 205 (3d ed. Anderson 1951).
21. 360 S.W.2d 71 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1962).
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this exception: "No benefits will be paid for hospitalization: ... (4)
resulting from insanity." For about three months plaintiff was hospitalized in two Memphis hospitals suffering from an illness she and
her witnesses were unable to describe with much clarity. An expert
witness called in the case, the senior resident in psychiatry at Gailor
Psychiatric Hospital, diagnosed plaintiffs illness as schizophrenic
reaction, paranoid type. He further testified that the term "insane'"
is no longer in use in psychiatry. That profession instead uses the
terms "neuroses" and "psychoses" and related language.22 The witness
stated that plaintiff suffered from a psychosis, a serious mental illness.
On the basis of this testimony, the trial judge found the term "insanity" to be ambiguous and on the ground that all ambiguities in
insurance contracts are to be resolved in favor of the insured, went on
to define insanity as a "complete condition of derangement" and concluded that plaintiff did not suffer from such a derangement. He
therefore permitted recovery. The court of appeals, speaking through
Judge Bejach, reversed. The court determined that in keeping with
the notions of modem medicine the term "insanity" as used in this
policy should be held to include that type of "illness treated by psychiatrists, which relates to the malfunction of the mind, as distinguished from illness of and injury to the body." In making this
determination, the court was guided not only by reference to a
number of standard legal and non-legal dictionaries, but by chapter
127 of the Public Acts of 1957 which amended title 33 of the Tennessee Code to provide that wherever the term "insane" appeared in
that title, the term "mentally ill" should be substituted. In doing
so the court stated that "it thus appears to us that by legislative enactment, the terms 'insanity' and 'mental illness' are made synonymous
with each other."24 Within the context of this decision this interpretation is probably correct, since mental illness which would require
hospitalization is no doubt usually of a severity such that it would in
layman's terms be called "insanity." One must be cautious, however,
in attempting to extend the force of this decision. "Mental illness"
is a broad term; for the purposes of the code it is made a substitute
for "insanity" only in a single title. It is probably doubtful that the
courts would find it proper to include within the term "insanity" some
of the less disturbing neuroses which still fall within the concept of
"mental illness."25 In all probability, therefore, it would be best to
regard this decision as standing for the proposition that the term "insanity" used in a hospitalization policy includes those mental diseases
22. Id. at 72.
23. Id. at 75.
24. Id. at 77.
25. Note the wide variety of ailments, some serious, some not, discussed in chapter
17 of LAWYERs' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA (1959).
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which would be decribed by psychiatrists as severe mental illness,
such as psychosis. Further and more refined definition may be required in future cases.
It should also be pointed out that the decision in Houston does not
overrule the earlier decision in Raulston v. Mutual Benefit Health &
Accident Ass'n2 which held that "if the assured is physically disabled
by the disease within the meaning of the policy... the fact that he
becomes mentally infirm [as a result] does not deprive him of the
benefits to which he is otherwise entitled. 2 7 The opinion in Houston
indicates by its silence on the point that no argument was made
to the effect that plaintiff's hospitalization was basically caused by
physical illness, of which the mental illness was but a consequence.
2. Oral Warranty Not Within Exclusion Clause of Garage Liability
Policy.-Kern v. Transit Casualty Co.,28 a decision of first impression
is of limited importance because of the relative rarity of its facts.
Plaintiff garage owner was covered by a garage liability policy which
contained this usual exclusion clause: "This policy does not apply
... to liability assumed by the insured under any contract or agreement except, under coverages A and B, (1) if in writing, any lease
of premises agreement or (2) a warranty of goods or products." One
of plaintiff's customers purchased an automobile from him but returned it when he discovered the brakes were defective. Plaintiff
agreed to repair the brakes and later returned the car to the customer,
telling him that the brakes had been fixed. When the customer applied them while driving shortly thereafter, the brakes locked
and an accident resulted. The customer then sued plaintiff, who
called on defendant insurer to defend the action and pay any judgment resulting. Defendant refused, on the grounds that plaintiff's
liability fell within the exclusion quoted above. Plaintiff then retained
an attorney and defended the suit. The customer's action was successful and a judgment was rendered against plaintiff. He then brought
this action, later prosecuted by his trustee in bankruptcy, demanding
(1) compensation for attorney's fees and other expenses incurred in
defending the personal injury action, (2) payment of the judgment,
and (3) reimbursement for his expenses in bringing the instant action.
Defendant's principal argument was based on the words "if in
writing" which is contended applied equally to leases and to warranties. The court found, with excellent reason, that it was at least
equally logical to regard this phrase as applying only to lease agreements. Thus an ambiguity was present and, applying the usual
principles of interpretation of contracts of adhesion, must be resolved
26. 22 Tenn. App. 101, 118 S.W.2d 881 (E.S. 1938).
27. 22 Tenn. App. at 107, 118 S.W.2d at 885.
28. 207 F. Supp. 437 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
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against the insurer. As a result, the insurer was held obliged to pay
the judgment. The insurer further argued that even if required to
pay the judgment, it should not be held liable for the expenses
incurred in defending the suit, since its refusal to defend was made
in good faith. The court properly rejected the argument. It is the
general rule that a refusal to defend in this type of situation is wrongful even though made in good faith.29 Therefore, the insurer is liable
for breach of its contract to defend and must respond by paying the
expenses of defense. The defendant insurer was not, however, required to pay the attorney's fee for conducting the instant action. It
was not specifically obligated to do so by contract or statute. Had the
insurer been found guilty of bad faith, the court indicated that it
would have allowed recovery under Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-1105. In this case, however, the court saw no evidence of bad
faith and refused to apply the statute.
3. Misrepresentationsby Applicant; Contracting Disease After Inception of Health Policy a Valid Condition Precedent.-Hermitage
Health & Life Insurance Co. v. Buchignani3 ° offered two alternative
grounds of decision. Plaintiff applicant for an insurance policy
allegedly failed to reveal to the agent who filled out his application
the names of all physicians who had examined him in the recent past.
At all events, not all the names were filled in on the application and
the plaintiff did not call the omission to defendant insurer's attention when a copy of the application was returned to him with the
policy, although he had ample opportunity to inspect the policy. The
court cited previous Tennessee authority to the effect that in the
absence of fraud by the agent a person who enters into a written
contract will be presumed to have read the contract. Thus plaintiff
would be guilty of material misrepresentations.
The health policy issued on the basis of the application also provided that in order to qualify for benefits, the cause of the disease
resulting in insured's loss must originate more than 15 days after the
inception of the policy. Such policy provisions are permissible in this
state.31 In this case the disease causing the loss apparently had
manifested itself long before the inception of the policy, although
not so seriously as it did after the policy was issued. Finding this
provision of the contract a condition precedent, the court denied recovery.
The most interesting problem suggested by this clause-the precise
meaning of the term "cause"- was not presented in the instant case.
29. See Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 694, 701-02 (1956). The annotation- is cited with
approval in the instant case.
30. 354 S.W.2d 94 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1962).
31. Dees v. National Cas. Co., 17 Tenn. App. 183, 66 S.W.2d 603 (W.S. 1933).
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There has been some disagreement among jurisdictions as to the time
at which one should say the disease has accrued within the meaning
of like clauses, and we may expect further litigation on the subject
in Tennessee.
II. MAKING AND MODIFYING TIM CONTRACT

A. Insurer Held Estopped To Rely on Coverage Limitation
Because of Agent's Conduct
Plaintiff insured in Miller v. Monticello Insurance Co.3 operated
a machine shop. He needed to obtain a loan and in order to do so
put up the machinery in his shop, including a portable welding
machine, as collateral. The bank which made the loan required
insured to take out a fire policy insuring the machinery with a loss
payable clause in its favor. Insured got in touch with defendant's
agent whose office was near the machine shop and requested that
he provide the coverage. As a result, the policy in this case was
issued. It provided fire and related insurance on the described
machinery "while located or contained as described in this policy, or
pro rata for five days at each proper place to which any of the
property shall necessarily be removed for preservation from the perils
insured against but not elsewhere." The location described was the
building in which the machine shop was located. While the portable
welding machine was being used at a place some 17 miles from the
shop, it was destroyed by fire. The company denied liability on the
grounds that the machine when injured was not located as described
in the policy.
There was some conflict in the testimony as to whether defendant's
agent discussed coverage of the welding machine in particular with
plaintiff. No conflict existed, however, as to the fact that plaintiff
asked the agent to write coverage on all his machinery. On the basis
of these facts, plaintiffs action was dismissed by the trial court,
apparently on the ground that plaintiffs proper remedy was an
equitable action for reformation of the policy before bringing suit
thereon. The court of appeals reversed, holding that it would be
unnecessary to bring an action for reformation, since a jury could
properly find from the testimony that the insurer had waived this
restriction on coverage and was estopped to deny coverage of this
welding machine.
This result is both just and proper. The reason an insurer should
be estopped to deny coverage when an insured has asked for full
32. See Helm v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 230 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950); 1
APPLEM iAN, INSuRANCE LAW AND PlAcTIcE § 406 (1941).

33. 361 S.W.2d 496 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1961).
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coverage and the insurer has issued only limited coverage without
pointing this out to the insured has been eloquently stated in Vance
on Insurance:
After all, the man on the street purchases his insurance policy in very
much the same way he purchases his automobile or his reaper or other
chattels. He knows no more about the making of a contract of insurance
than he does about the making of an automobile, and he naturally relies

upon the skill and good faith of those who hold themselves out to be
experts in such matters, by advertising their wares for sale. It would seem

to be the clear duty of the insurer, professing to draw an instrument protecting the applicant's property against certain defined perils, to exercise due

diligence to supply a policy which will effect the purpose intended. Any
damage caused to the applicant through the agent's mistakes or negligence
in making inquiries that he should know to be pertinent should rest on the

insurer. The situation seems to be strikingly analogous to that expressed in
the familiar rule of the law of sales to the effect that a vendor supplying an
article which he knows is to be used for a specific purpose impliedly warrants
that the article furnished is suitable for that purpose.34

B. ForbearanceTo Cancel Policy Held Valid Consideration
for Rider Limiting Coverage
In September 1959, John M. Johnson was issued a policy of automobile liability insurance by defendant insurer. The classification
used for the policy was I-B, which is that used when there are no
drivers under 25 in a household. In November of that year an agent
of the company learned that insured's stepson was living in his household, and that the stepson was under 25. The agent then went to
insured and, at the agent's request, insured signed an endorsement
providing: "in consideration of the premium charged it is understood
and agreed that there shall be no coverage under this policy while
the automobile insured is driven by Charles Sherron . . . ." On
February 5, while Sherron was driving the insured vehicle, he negligently injured a third party who recovered a judgment against him
and his stepfather. Plaintiff now sues for recovery of the amounts
paid out as a result.m1
The sole point at issue is whether the endorsement was invalid.
for lack of consideration. The consideration recited in the endorsement papers signed by plaintiff was "the premium charged," obviously
meaning the willingness of the insurer to undertake the risk for this
particular premium rate. Plaintiff had, however, already paid the
premium at the time the endorsement was executed. The only other
basis for finding consideration in this set of facts was the fact that
34. Vkxcn, INsuRANcE § 89, at 540 (3d ed. Anderson 1951).
35. Johnson v. Central Nat'l Ins. Co., 356 S.W.2d 277 (Tenn. 1962).
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defendant insurer did not exercise its privilege to cancel the policy.
It was stipulated by the parties that if plaintiff had not agreed to
accept this endorsement, the insurer would have done so; had this
been done, sufficient time would have elapsed prior to the accident
so that the contract would not have been in force.
While it is generally held that an agreement to accept such a rider
requires consideration in order to bind the insured, the jurisdictions
are split on the question of whether forbearance to cancel can serve
as consideration. 36 The majority rule is apparently in accord with the
instant decision. Missouri, however, has held that such forbearance
is not consideration for such an agreement because the insurer has
given up nothing; the company still retains the power to cancel even
37
after refraining to cancel at the time it added the rider to the policy.
It is submitted that the decision of the Tennessee court in the instant
case is proper. First, a contrary holding would probably not result in
anything other than a "paper" change in the procedures of liability
insurers. As the opinion points out, the company could simply cancel
the existing policy, return the premium, and issue a new policy containing the desired rider, accepting the check it had just given the
insured as the initial premium payment on the newly issued policy.
Requiring this red-tape approach seems to this writer neither helpful
nor desirable. In the second place, even if one feels that no consideration was given by the insurer it is at least arguable that the basic
elements of an estoppel are present in this kind of situation. If the
insured's expression of willingness to accept the rider can be regarded
as a representation-which does not seem strained-then surely the
company's forbearance to cancel could be thought of as conduct in
reliance to the company's detriment.
One important limitation on the effect of this decision must be
noted. In order to serve as consideration, the forbearance to cancel
should be bargained for; and to establish estoppel, the forbearance to
cancel should be foreseeable conduct on the part of the insurer. Thus,
neither approach would be appropriate unless at the time the endorsement is added the insured is made conscious of the fact that if he
does not agree to the rider his policy will be cancelled. Insurers
would be well advised, therefore, to spell out in the endorsement
documents the fact that forbearance to cancel at that time is conduct bargained for by the insured.
36. The few cases in point are discussed in Annot., 52 A.L.R.2d 826 (1957).
also 13 APPLEmAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRA cCE § 7603 (1943).
37. Rice v. Provident Life & Ace. Ins. Co., 102 S.W.2d 147 (Mio. App. 1937).

See
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C. Fire Insurance Agent Held Not To Be Agent of Insured for
Purpose of Cancellation
Moore v. New Amsterdam Casualty Insurance Co.m involved the
issue whether an agent who had been told to obtain coverage on a
certain risk had also been empowered to cancel the policy originally
taken out and obtain another in its stead. The evidence concerning
the extent of the agent's power was both conflicting and ambiguous.
Finding the insurance agent involved to be a "soliciting agenf' rather
than a "broker" under the facts of the case, the court employed the
Tennessee statute making soliciting agents the agents of the company
rather than of the insured in matters relating to the policy. 39 The
court's extended discussion of the testimony in the case indicates that
the same result would probably have followed even in the absence
of the statute. The strongest evidence of authority to cancel was
testimony that insured instructed the agent to "keep me covered."
As has been said in Appleman on Insurance: "Usually, however, an
agent to procure a policy has no authority to cancel it, even though he
may have custody of the policy or have authority to keep the property
insured."40
III. GOVERNMENT REGULATION
In Long v. National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters41 the Supreme Court of Tennessee indicated the broad scope of the powers
of the commissioner of insurance. Two insurance rating bureaus
filed requests for increased rates with the commissioner, basing their
request on the combined experience of well over one hundred insurers. The commissioner held a hearing upon the requests, and then
denied them, stating his reasons in writing as required by section
56-603(e) of the Tennessee Code. The reasons stated were principally
that it would be unjust to grant a request to so large a group of
insurers when many were already making an adequate profit and
would make what the commissioner regarded as exorbitant profits if
the request were granted. The power of the commissioner to approve
and disapprove rates is given by a statute passed in 1945 which also
provided for the licensing of rating bureaus.4 Under the statute,
insurers who file as members of the bureau are bound by the group
rate established as a result, but an individual company may request
a variation for itself if it so desires. 43 To do so it must make the same
38. 199 F. Supp. 941 (E.D. Tenn. 1961).
39. TENN. CODE ANN.§ 56-705 (1956).
40. 16 APPLE AN, INSTrBANCE LAw AND PRAMCCE § 8723, at 146 (1944).

41. 354 S.W.2d 255 (Tenn. 1961).
42. TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-604 (1956).
43. TENN.CODE ANN. § 56-610 (1956).
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type of filing, reflecting its individual experience, which the rating

organization must file for a group rate. The statute provides in
general terms that rates shall be "fair, reasonable, adequate and not

unfairly discriminatory." Prior to this language the statute lists various
factors which the commissioner should consider in making his deter-

mination: loss experience, catastrophe hazards, reasonable margins for
profit and contingencies, policyholder's dividends (participating
policies only), and "all other relevant factors within and without the
state."44
In this case the court reversed a decision of the trial court directing
the commissioner to reconsider his decision. The court indicated its
continued approval of the Craig45 decision by holding that the only

question for the court in a case of this sort is whether the commissioner exceeded the scope of his authority. It then apparently found
that under the statute just quoted, the variation in experience between companies was a relevant factor, and therefore within the

authority of the commissioner to consider. The weight to be accorded
various factors was held to be for the commissioner, not the courts,
and in the absence of a showing of illegal arbitrary action, his decision
must be upheld.46 The opinion seems to imply that the action was
not unduly arbitrary because of the opportunity available to individual insurers to request variant rates.

IV.

NEG3OTATIO

AND SETMLEMENT

A. Enforcement of Arbitration Provision for Appraisal of Loss

In Case v. Hanover Fire Insurance Co.,47 the court properly enforced the provision of a fire policy which called for arbitration of the
amount of loss in case of disagreement between insurer and insured
as a condition precedent to bringing an action on the policy.48 Two

44. TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-602 (1956).
45. North British & Mercantile Co. v. Craig, 106 Tenn. 621, 62 S.W. 155 (1901).
46. The Tennessee court's reluctance to interfere with the commissioner is shared by
many jurisdictions. The general pattern of decisions has been summarized thus: "Ratemaking is not essentially a judicial function, but where the duty imposed upon a
public official by statute is to establish a rate that is adequate, just, and reasonable,
it is the duty of the court to see that a rate of that description is promulgated by him
...
A court in reviewing rates as fixed or approved by state authorities . . . will
not disturb such rates unless such authorities exceeded their powers, acted unreasonably,
based their action upon a mistake of law, made a finding contrary to or unsupported
by the evidence, or set a confiscatory rate .... ." 2 Coucu, INsURANCE § 21:38
(2d ed. 1959). As this passage indicates, a number of courts are willing to exerciso
a more general power of review than is the case in Tennessee, but few are willing to
encroach very far upon the commissioner's discretion.
47. 359 S.W.2d 831 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1962).
48. To be a condition precedent to bringing an action on the policy, the policy must
show that this is the intention of the parties. VANCE, INsURANCE § 155, at 880 (3d
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companies were involved. After negotiating with insured concerning
a loss, they were unable to reach agreement as to its extent. They
then sent a joint letter demanding arbitration and naming their
appointee to the arbitration panel. According to testimony accepted
by the court, insured refused to accept delivery of the letter. As
pointed out by the court, it is unlikely that such a joint letter would
be an effective demand in this state.49 Later, however, individual
letters were written by each company for the same purpose and an
adjuster was sent with these to the insured's house. Insured refused
to take the letters after talking with the adjuster, but they were left
on a table in her house, to her knowledge. Under these circumstances
it was undeniably correct for the court to hold that proper demand
had been made on insured and that she was obliged to submit the
matter to arbitration as provided by the contract.
Insured attempted to raise an objection on trial to the person named
by the insurers as arbitrator on the grounds that he was not a competent disinterested person. The court stated that it found no evidence to indicate the arbitrator named was not appointed as
provided by the contract, but did not dwell on the point at any
length, apparently because insured did not make the objection
sufficiently early.
B. Allocating Proceeds of Credit Life Policy
Kincaid v. Alderson50 involved a type of policy becoming more
prevalent in the United States, credit life insurance. The use of such
insurance is somewhat different from that of most life policies, and a
consideration of the purpose of such contracts suggests a possible
criticism of this decision. The facts of the case were relatively simple.
A purchased a mobile home and, in order to pay for it, executed a
chattel mortgage to B to secure a note for $6,439.20. Installment
payments of $107.32 a month were to be made on the note. This sum
included payments of premiums on a credit life policy on A's life,
proceeds payable to B to the extent of the unpaid amount on the
note, the rest to be paid to A's representative. After about two years,
A sold the trailer to C. C paid A $600 and executed a title bond by
which he assumed the remainder of the debt owed to B, $4,982.80. C
ed. Anderson 1951). Such an intention may, in Tennessee, be inferred from a consideration of the entire policy. Palatine Ins. Co. v. Morton-Scott-Robertson Co., 106
Tenn. 558, 573-75, 61 S.W. 787 (1901). The policy in the instant case contained
language sufficient to meet the requirement. 359 S.W.2d at 833.
49. Palatine Ins. Co. v. Morton-Scott-Robertson Co., 106 Tenn. 558, 576-77, 61
S.W. 787, 791-92 (1901), holding a joint demand by eleven insurance agents invalid.
50. 354 S.W.2d 775 (Tenn. 1962). See the discussions of this case in Lacey,
Creditor's Rights-1962 Tennessee Survey, 16 VAND L. REv. 709-11 (1963); Wade
Restitution-1962 Tennessee Survey, 16 V.AND. L. REv. 859, 860 (1963).
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then made regular payments to B of $107.32 a month. A few months
later, A was killed. B was paid by the insurer. C brings this suit
against A's representative to clear his title to the mobile home, on the
grounds that the payment to B should be regarded as discharging C's,
debt.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee, through the distinguished late
Chief Justice Prewitt, denied relief to C. The court characterized the
situation after the sale of the trailer to C in terms of suretyship, C
being the principal debtor and A the surety. It is a familiar rule that
if a surety pays the debt of the principal, the principal must reimburse
the surety.51 The court applied the rule to this case, holding C liable
to A's widow for the amount paid B by the insurer.
The suretyship rule announced by the court is undeniably correct,
and one cannot quarrel with the court's adoption of the rule that a
principal debtor has no insurable interest in the life of his surety.5 2
But one feels that the court's opinion does not sufficiently indicate
the possibility that certain opposing principles may also be applicable.
Comment e to section 76 of the Restatement of Restitution states:
The right to indemnity is not precluded by the fact that the payor has been
given securities by the principal obligor, out of which he is privileged to

reimburse himself. He cannot, however, retain the securities after recovering
full indemnity. If he disposes of them or if they are lost as a result of his
fault, his indemnity is reduced to the extent of their value.
It is submitted that this principle may apply to this case. Credit life
insurance serves a purpose closely akin to that served by collateral
securities. While it is true that such policies protect the cestui que
vie's family from the dangers of a heavily indebted estate, the person
53
really interested in seeing the insurance taken out is the creditor.
This is obvious in the instant case from the fact that it was the
creditor who saw to it that the policy was arranged for and included
the amount of the premiums in the monthly payments on the note.
Moreover, it is disturbing that the court dismissed summarily the
argument by C that the execution of the contract by which C agreed
to pay sums including insurance premiums should be considered as
51.

llrTATE-,mNT, REsTITTON

§ 76 (1937).

52. There are virtually no cases on point, but a leading text on the basis of a single
decision announces the proposition accepted by the Tennessee court. VANCE, INStmANCE § 31, at 199 (3d ed. Anderson 1951). Of course if the transaction in this case
be viewed as an assignment of the policy, insurable interest is no problem. See Grigsby
v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149 (1911).
53. For a popularized discussion of credit life insurance, including comments on its
abuse, see BLAcEc, Buy Now, PAY LATER ch. 11 (1961). The widespread use of this
insurance as a type of collateral is indicated by the fact that 96 per cent of New
York bank loans in 1962 were covered by credit life policies. 17 PERSONAL FIN. L. Q.

REP. 61 (1963).
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affecting an assignment of the policy. The court said simply that since
B arranged for the policy- and was the beneficiary of it, A had no
interest in the policy to assign. This line of reasoning seems questionable. Since A was to pay the premium, and since his heirs would
receive benefits from the policy in the event the unpaid debt was less
than the amount of the insurance, B should be regarded simply as A's
agent for the purpose of taking out the policy.5 Taking this view, A
clearly had an assignable beneficial interest in the policy and the court
should have examined the transaction between A and C to determine
whether such an assignment took place.
This decision does not unduly trouble one's sense of justice. The
amounts paid as premiums by C were undoubtedly quite small
(though certainly at least this amount should be allowed C if A is to
have full benefit of the proceeds). Moreover, C will not in the long
run pay more than he anticipated would be necessary to pay when he
purchased the mobile home. But the decision is disturbing in its
adherence to certain technical principles in the absence of the reasons
supporting those principles. To say that A's death caused payment
of C's debt is not necessarily to say that A paid the debt. If A had
paid a lump-sum premium for the policy that would be true; but
under these facts A paid only term premiums sufficient to keep the
policy alive for the length of time during which he was making
monthly payments on the note. He was not paying for the insurance
when he died; C was. Still more disturbing, however, is the absence
of any examination of the character and purpose of this type of insurance. Life insurance is a marvelously flexible instrument for the
achievement of many ends. If it is to be used as security, should
not the courts consider the possibility of treating it like other forms of
security and applying to it the same rules that would be applied to
analogous types of collateral? This writer views the situation in this
way: By paying premiums on a life policy whose cestui que vie was
A, C placed in his creditor's hands a thing of value-a potential right
of recovery under contract. That right was exercised. When it was,
C should have been given the benefit.
C. Insurer's Duty To Settle Under Liability Policy
One of the most troublesome types of cases that can be brought
under a liability policy is an action by an insured alleging that be54. VANCE, INSURANCE § 123 (3d ed. Anderson 1951) states that where the creditor
takes out the policy, the contract should be regarded as purely between the creditor
and the insurer. However, in the same section, the writer notes that the weight of
authority is contra, and that it "naturally follows that these courts give any excess of
the insurance money over the debt and charges to the personal representative of the
debtor." Id. at 739-40. Since that is precisely what this policy provided, one can see
no objection whatever to employing the agency approach.
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cause of an insurer's wrongful failure to settle the insured has been
damaged by an award above policy limits and asking that the insurer
be required to pay this additional amount.5 Such a case was Perry
v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. Plaintiff insured was sued
by a third party, who alleged damages resulting from the negligent
operation of insured's tow truck. After investigation, the insurer
decided that there was no liability under the facts. It therefore made
a very small offer of settlement and declined the injured party's settlement offer of a much larger amount. The injured party's suit was
successful, resulting in a judgment beyond the face value of the
policy. Insured then brought this action against the insurer to recover
the balance of the judgment over the policy value. In the trial court,
a verdict was directed for the defendant.
Insured urged two grounds of reversal on appeal. One was that
the judge directed the verdict on the grounds that insured was required to show bad faith rather than negligence on the part of the
insurer. In answering this, the court quoted the statement made in
the Norris case5 7 to the effect that in such cases bad faith must be
shown. To amplify what it means by bad faith the court outlined
six points which it regards as a guide for determining bad faith.'
Reading these points, one is struck by the similarity between the
language used and that which might be used if negligence were the
test. The insurer is charged, for instance, with the duty to make an
"honest and fair investigation" and to take into consideration the
application of the relevant rules of law. It is then for the insurer to
"exercise reasonable judgment based upon those elements whether
or
not the claim should be settled." This idea of "reasonable judgment"
immediately brings negligence concepts to mind. However, the court
also says that "having so investigated, a mistake of judgment would
not constitute bad faith."59 The ambivalence of this language leads
one to the conclusion that the court is formulating a standard for
determining the presence of bad faith which is not so rigorous as to
require a showing of intentional disregard of insured's interest, but is
more rigorous than an ordinary negligence standard. 0 If this surmise
is correct, it may require several more decisions, including some by
the state supreme court, to delineate the standard precisely.
Insured's second assignment of error was the usual one to the effect
55. See Keeton, Ancillary Rights of the Insured Against his Liability In=urer, 13
VAND. L. REv. 837 (1960). The article contains a discussion of several relevant Tennessee cases.
56. 359 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1962).
57. Southern Fire & Cas. Co. v. Norris, 35 Tenn. App. 657, 250 S.V.2d 785 (E.S.
1952).
58. 358 S.W.2d at 7.
59. Ibid.
60. See Keeton, supra note 55, at 841-42.
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that the evidence was insufficient to support a directed verdict. The
court reviewed the testimony at great length. From this review it
seems unlikely that insurer could be regarded as having acted
negligently or in bad faith although a jurisdiction adopting the
negligence view might possibly have allowed the jury to assess the
importance of the loss of one item of physical evidence.

